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et al.: Double Jeopardy

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
N.Y. CONST. art. L § 6.
No person shall be subject to be tivice put in jeopardy for the

same offense ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V:

No person shall be. ... subjectfor the same offence to be tvice
put in jeopardy of life or limb ....

COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Latham 19 9
(decided February 10, 1994)

The defendant claimed that his conviction of attempted murder,
and his subsequent indictment of murder in the second degree
when the victim died, violated his right against double jeopardy
pursuant to the Constitutions of New York 2 0 0 and the United
States, 20 1 and New York Criminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.). 2 0 2
The New York Court of Appeals found that "the 'delayed death'

exemption from New York's statutory protection against double
jeopardy 2 3...extends to the offense of attempted
199. 1994 WL 35556, at *1 (N.Y. Feb. 10, 1994).
200. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Article 1, § 6 of the New York Constitution
provides in part: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense...." Id.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.
202. N.Y. CIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(1) (McKinney 1992). Section
40.20(1) states: "A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense."
Id.
203. N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAw § 40.20(2)(d) (McKinney 1992). Section
40.20(2)(d) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law states:
A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses based upon
the same act or criminal transaction unless... [o]ne of the offenses is
assault or some other offense resulting in physical injury to a person,
and the other offense is one of homicide based upon the death of such
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murder .... "204 Consequently, the court upheld the defendant's
conviction of attempted murder and reinstated the indictment of
murder in the second degree by finding no violation of either the
State or Federal Constitutions. 205
On May 18, 1990, the defendant, Ronald Latham, strangled
and stabbed his estranged girlfriend. 20 6 The victim was found
several hours later near death, and following surgery, suffered a
stroke. 20 7 The victim was left virtually paralyzed and required
life support. 208
On January 9, 1991, Latham pled guilty to attempted murder in
the second degree, in full satisfaction of his indictment for
attempted murder and attempted assault. 209 The defendant was
sentenced to 7 1/2 to 22 1/2 years in prison. 2 10 Although a report
from the victim's physician indicated that he was unable to
determine if the victim would ever recover, the issue regarding
further prosecution if the victim died was never raised. 2 11 Seven
weeks later, the victim died of her injuries and Latham was
indicted for intentional murder and committed a murder with
depraved indifference. 2 12
Claiming that his second indictment was barred by the state and
federal constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, the
defendant *moved to dismiss the indictment. 2 13 The defendant's
motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court. 2 14 The appellate

person from the same physical injury, and such death occurs after the
prosecution for the assault or other non-homicide offense ....
Id.

204. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *1.
205. Id.

206. Id.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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division reversed the trial court's order and reinstated the
2 15
indictment.
The court of appeals first responded to the defendant's statutory
claim, because the enactment of C.P.L. section 40.20 was a
legislative attempt to afford the defendant greater protection
against double jeopardy than the Federal Constitution. 2 16 Under
the Federal Constitution, only separate prosecutions arising out
of the "same offense" constitute double jeopardy. 2 17 In
Blockburger v. United States,2 18 the Court, in devising a test to
ascertain what would constitute the "same offense" for double
jeopardy purposes, held that determining whether there are two
offenses or one centers on "whether each provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not."219
In broadening the federal criteria for determining whether a
person has been previously prosecuted for an offense, the New
York Legislature enumerated six exemptions 220 to successive
prosecutions which would receive no statutory protections. 22 1 In
Latham, the court focused its attention on C.P.L. section
40.20(2)(d), since the People claimed that the defendant's murder
indictment was permissible within this so called "delayed death"
exemption.222 The "delayed death" exemption permits
subsequent prosecution of a defendant for a homicidal offense to
a victim, after the defendant has already been prosecuted for a
215. People v. Latham, 188 A.D.2d 5, 594 N.Y.S.2d 429 (3d Dep't 1993).
216. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *2.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

218. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Blockburger was charged with five counts of
sale of narcotics. Id. at 299-300. There were several successive sales involved,
all to the same purchaser. Id. The defendant claimed that such successive sales
constituted a single offense. Id.
219. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted). The Court adopted
the language: "A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each
statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from
prosecution and punishment under the other." (quoting Morey v.
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871)).
220. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 40.20(2)(a)-(f) (McKinney 1992).
221. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *2.
222. Id.
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2 23
non homicidal offense based on that victim's physical injury.
The People maintained that attempted murder is a non homicide
offense, and as such, a subsequent prosecution for murder is
224
within the boundaries allowable under the exemption.
The court of appeals agreed that the prosecution must proceed
based on the victim's present condition, but where death follows,
' 225
"it is also in society's interest that the homicide be redressed."
226
Eleven years earlier, the court of appeals, in People v. Rivera,
observed that subsequent death to an assault is a supervening fact
expressly permitting a second prosecution within the
227
interpretation of the statute.
In refining its definition of a "non-homicide offense," as it is
used in the exemption, the court noted the definition of homicide
in the New York Penal Law as "conduct causing the death of a
person." 228 When there is no death, there is no homicide, thus
"attempted murder, which fails to cause the death of a person, is
229
thus by definition a 'non-homicide' offense."
In holding that there was no statutory claim available to the
defendant, the court next reviewed his state and federal
constitutional claims.230 The defendant asserted that under Grady
v. Corbin,2 3 1 his subsequent prosecution was barred, in that the

223. Id.; see also N.Y. CuM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(2)(d).
224. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *2.
225. Id.
226. 60 N.Y. 2d. 110, 456 N.E.2d 492, 468 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1983).
227. Id at 115, 456 N.E.2d at 495, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 604. (holding that
charging the defendant with murder in which the death occurred after the first

conviction for assault did not place the defendant in of double jeopardy).
228. Lathan, 1994 WL 35556, at *2; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00
(McKinney 1987).

229. Lathan, 1994 WL 35556, at *2.
230. Id.
231. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by, United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993). The defendant, Corbin, was issued two traffic tickets for driving
while intoxicated and for failure to keep to the right of the median. Id. at 511.
The automobile accident resulted in one fatality and injury to another. Id.
Corbin pled guilty to the traffic offenses. Id. at 513. Following his indictment
for reckless manslaughter, Corbin claimed that this subsequent prosecution was
for the same offense, for which he had already pled guilty and was thus
constitutionally barred on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 513-14.
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Blockburger test is not the only standard for determining the
impermissibility of successive prosecutions. 2 32 The Grady Court
articulated the "same conduct" test, holding that successive
prosecutions will be barred where the second prosecution
requires relitigation of the factual issues already resolved in the
first prosecution, and the government will be required to prove
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted. 233
The court of appeals, in Latham, pointed out that the recent
United States Supreme. Court decision of United States v.
Dixon,234 overruled the Grady "same conduct" test and
reinstated the holding in Blockburger as the sole test needed to
determine the constitutionality of successive prosecutions. 23 5 The
Court in Dixon, although hesitant to reconsider precedent, felt
that the rule of Grady was poorly articulated and unworkable. 236
Furthermore, they observed that the result in Grady was based on
"less than accurate historical analysis," and lacked factual
constitutional basis. 237 Dixon concluded that subsequent
prosecutions do not have to satisfy the "same conduct" test. 238
It is important to note that even under the Grady decision, it is
unlikely the defendant's assertion in Latham would have been
sustained. The Court in Grady noted that there would be an
exception to the "same conduct" test when the state, although
using due diligence, is unable to proceed on the more serious
charge because "the additional facts necessary to sustain that
charge have not occurred or have not been discovered." 239
In analyzing the facts of Latham using the Blockburger test, the
court of appeals held that the element of death distinguished the
defendant's conviction for attempted murder from intentional
232. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *2.
233. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521.
234. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).

235. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *3.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
Id.
Id.
Grady, 495 U.S. at 516 n.7 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,

169 (1977)).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 16

868

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

murder. 240 The "same offense" did not exist in the successive
prosecution, and as such the subsequent prosecution would not be
24 1
barred by any federal constitutional double jeopardy restraints.
Furthermore, since the defendant did not claim any greater
protection under the New York State Constitution than under the
Federal Constitution, any secondary constitutional analysis was
242
unnecessary and both claims were rejected by the court.
The defendant also maintained that the state had breached its
promise against subsequent prosecution implied in the original
plea bargain, and specific performance was mandated to reinstate
the original agreement. 243 The Latham court agreed that if the
intentions of the prosecutor and the defendant, at the time of the
plea bargain, was to "close the matter forever," then there would
have been a breach of promise. 244 This breach, therefore, would
245
have mandated specific performance of the original bargain.
The court noted, however, that New York does not adhere to a
subjective double jeopardy rule. 24 6 The fact that neither the
People nor the defendant raised any question regarding further
prosecution in the event of the victim's death, would not bar
prosecution based on the defendant's presumption that his plea
would end all criminal prosecutions resulting from his
conduct. 247
240. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *3.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.

245. Id; see also State v. Carpenter, 623 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio 1993). The

Supreme Court of Ohio held that unless the state expressly reserves the right to
file additional charges, on the record, at the time of the defendant's plea, it

cannot indict the defendant for murder after the court has accepted a negotiated
guilty plea to a lesser offense. Id. at 68; State v. Nelson, 579 A.2d 1104, 1106
(Conn. App. Ct. 1990) ("If the state were reserving a right to reprosecute [a
defendant], in the event of the victim's death, it could have, and should have,
said so."). But see State v. Thomas, 294 A.2d 57 (N.J. 1972) (indicating there

may be circumstances in which the conduct of the defendant has been so
dishonest as to justify the court in depriving him of the agreed to plea bargain).
246. Latham, 1994 WL 35556, at *3.

247. Id.
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New York has long recognized that a state is free, as a matter
of its own law, to impose greater protection to defendants than
those that the Supreme Court holds to be necessary under federal
constitutional standards. New York has done just that in the
constitutional realm of double jeopardy, as is apparent in the
New York Criminal Procedure Law, which provides greater
protections than those afforded a defendant under both State and
Federal Constitutions, which simply requires the prohibition
against double jeopardy for "the same offense." In the context of
the facts enunciated in Latham, C.P.L. section 40.20(2)(d)
legislatively articulates that under federal and state constitutional
analysis, the death of an injured person is the principal element
of homicide. It is the element that creates a separate offense from
attempted murder and permits successive prosecutions without
subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
24 8
People v. Mitchell
(decided October 25, 1993)

Defendant asserted that his right to be free from double
jeopardy under the State249 and Federal25 0 Constitutions was
violated when the court, which earlier granted the defendant's
motion for a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct, later
denied the defendant's request for a dismissal of his indictment
248. 197 A.D.2d 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dep't 1993).
249. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... "

Id.
250. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Fifth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " Id. The Fourteenth Amendment

provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

7

